Author: Clif Clemotte

By Clif Clemotte

Red tory defined

Summary: Red toryism is a Canadian political tradition which continues to express itself in voting patterns and voters’ beliefs, even though the traditional label is typically misused today. In this piece, I identify four principles which can be drawn from historic red toryism to guide red tories (and Canadian conservatives more generally) today: (1) Active governance, (2) Intervention and welfare, (3) Communitarianism, and (4) Internationalism.

What is a red tory in the modern Canadian context? Though the phrase seems less and less frequently used, it has colloquially come to mean a fiscal conservative with socially progressive views. But this is a reversal of its original meaning. That original meaning often appears in slogan form as ‘cultural conservatism with socialist economics,’ but more can and must be said.

When Gad Horowitz coined the term ‘red tory’ in 1966, he gave it distinct connotations for distinct political contexts. In the context of real-world voting patterns, the term denotes “a Conservative who prefers the CCF-NDP to the Liberals, or a socialist who prefers the Conservatives to the Liberals, without really knowing why.” Under this connotation, the red tory political tradition is still with us in the form of NDP-Conservative switchers, though this category of switch voters is likely quite small.

Alternatively, within the context of political theory, Horowitz defines a red tory as “a conscious ideological Conservative with some ‘odd’ socialist notions… or a conscious ideological socialist with some ‘odd’ tory notions.” (I myself fall into this alternative sense of red toryism, i.e., a conscious ideological Conservative with some odd socialist notions.) And the paradigmatic red tory is “a philosopher who combines elements of socialism and toryism so thoroughly in a single integrated Weltanschauung that it is impossible to say that he is a proponent of either one as against the other.” It is less obvious that this form of red toryism is a living tradition today.

While of course voter choices and political philosophies may coincide, the existence of NDP-Conservative switchers does not itself indicate a current of political thought in Canada’s broader political culture. Nonetheless, I suggest that the basic political outlook of red toryism is in fact still with us. Better evidence for red tory thought comes from the apparent strength of traditional red tory political beliefs in the Canadian population, even when deprived of a proper label.

In early 2025, Abacus Data found that cultural conservatives with progressive economic views made up 21% of their population sample, compared to only 6% of the population sample identifying as cultural progressives with conservative economic views. This group corresponds neatly with red toryism as a political ideology. When supplemented by the additional 32% of the sample who held some combination of conservative and progressive tendencies in tension, the current vitality of red toryism under both Horowitz’s connotations seems undeniable. Indeed, red toryism in its original sense seems a far more vibrant and relevant political tradition today than red toryism in its misused sense!

While this is of course merely one poll, it still suggests that red toryism is a living political tradition today, albeit under cover. But to remain living, it must not only exist but also must carry basic principles which can drive policies and frame political vision. In this piece, I suggest some tentative basic principles which can be drawn from the red tory tradition.

1. Active governance

First, I suggest that the core principle underlying red toryism is the belief that the state should be active. More specifically, red tories reject the contemporary version of conservatism which equates conservatism with classical liberalism, believing instead that some level of state activity is necessary to a flourishing society. Ordered liberty does not spontaneously emerge from collisions of individuals with purely private values and goals. Note that this active role for government does not entail authoritarian theocracy or the curtailment of civil liberties! There is a middle ground between pursuing neutrality and enforcing a comprehensive doctrine. Far from enforcing a comprehensive doctrine, red tories instead view the state as having an essential role in some limited cultural elements and values.

Which elements and values exactly are chosen is a matter of prudence and must be governed by the virtue of moderation; I suggest that Kenneth Boessenkool’s basic framework for positive social conservatism is a useful initial guide. Examples might include preserving civic traditions, such as celebrating constitutional role of the Crown in our parliamentary system or the Anglican ceremonies surrounding Remembrance Day (and for the record, I am no Anglican); designing policies as ‘nudges’ towards some moderate (but substantive) values, such as stable family formation or human-scaled walkable cities; and generally renewing the mores of parliamentary government, making visible through aesthetics and rhetoric a tradition so often submerged by American republicanism.

Crucially, this parliamentary emphasis is the mechanism preventing a government with values from becoming an authoritarian regime, since opposition is one of the two lungs through which parliament breathes. This also highlights the importance of distinguishing between constitutional principles and partisan principles. It would be inappropriate to establish a constitution predisposed towards one political party, but it is nonetheless appropriate for a party to govern according to its values once granted a mandate. The red tory political agenda does not aspire to mere neutral managerialism.

2. Intervention and welfare

Second, and closely related to the first principle, red tories accept that nation-building can require economic sacrifice, and for that reason are willing to entertain government intervention in the economy (even for sub-optimal economic outcomes) if they serve some other political value. This principle is important but most not be over-stated. Red tories may be tempted to prefer inefficient economic policies over efficient ones, and this would be an error. By and large, free exchange, free markets, and free trade are the best available mechanism for achieving nation-building goals, and red tories need not oppose this.

This second principle is more negative than positive. Unlike the caricature Reaganite, who is a priori opposed to government intervention in free market principles, the red tory is not a priori opposed to government intervention in an economy, whether in the form of industrial policy, some limited protection, or expansive welfare. As an example of the latter, Hugh Segal’s support for a basic income is a policy proposal red tories (and policy writers in general) should take seriously today.

Nonetheless, this tolerance for intervention does not dispense from the necessity of making economic decisions based upon empirical evidence. Nor does this tolerance dispense from the prudence of being pro tanto predisposed towards free markets, with interventions reflecting prudential exceptions rather than primary inclinations. Wasteful industrial policies, unlimited protectionism, and complicated welfare programs all tend to erode or reverse economic growth, and lost growth is in turn a major injustice which no society should be forced to bear. The key here is that the decisions must still be empirically informed, rather than solely ideologically driven.

3. Communitarianism

Third, red tories are communitarians rather than individualists, loosely speaking. One way of phrasing this might be as follows: a society and its common goods are not merely the sum of individuals. In keeping with the classical tradition of virtue ethics and standard contemporary economics, there exist common or public goods which are irreducible to individual values and choices, which do not diminish when shared among individuals, and which must be actively provided. Classic examples of public goods include navigational lighthouses or the provision of free markets.

Achieving these common goods, in turn, calls for a conception of citizenship structured around both rights and responsibilities. This principle is closely related to the first principle above, in that the state must provide for more than just a neutral arena where individuals pursue their individual values independently of each other. Conversely, maximal individual rights are not the source and summit of political values, and may be constrained by legitimate public goods. I would suggest that Fred Delorey’s defence of Nova Scotia’s 2025 fire bans (including bans on hiking) is an example of red tory communitarianism, albeit perhaps unconsciously.

This communitarianism entails a rejection of classical liberalism to an extent, but this point must not be over-stated: Red toryism is not postliberalism. Rather, red toryism is a an element within the broader tory political tradition, and one which evolved alongside liberalism through direct interaction. Toryism and its sub-currents are as much a part of the parliamentary political tradition as liberalism (both classical and otherwise) and are not mere political latecomers.

For instance, when reading Benjamin Disraeli’s 1835 work Vindication of the English Constitution, one finds a political vision decidedly at odds with the ‘classical’ liberal ideal of radical individualism and the ideal of a valueless state. Nonetheless, Disraeli presents toryism as a political tradition which protects robust individual civil rights, and indeed is structured so as to elevate those rights into abilities. (Whether his historic claims are accurate must be distinguished from the political ideals he promotes in that text.) Freedom, civil liberties, and personal rights are ideals claimed by many political traditions, and not just by liberalism.

It would be anachronistic to describe Disraeli as a postliberal, and unfair to view him as an opponent of parliamentary democracy. He advocated for parliamentary government and the English tradition of political freedoms (albeit also marked by his era’s imperfections) while simultaneously rejecting liberalism as a political philosophy. Again, freedom, civil liberties, and individual rights are not the exclusive property of philosophical liberalism; other political philosophies can cherish and protect these values also.

It is also important to emphasize the extent to which the notion of ‘classical’ liberalism is a somewhat artificial construct. Contemporary classical liberals identify themselves with the tradition associated with John Locke, Adam Smith, and J. S. Mill, but often seem to read that tradition back into this canon, obscuring these philosophers’ actual views on morality and social collectives. For instance, Locke’s A letter concerning toleration makes substantive space in society for self-regulating associations, and he in fact begins his argument for individual toleration by identifying the freedoms owed to associations qua associations. This type of argument does not carry the narrowly individualistic focus of today’s classical liberals, and in fact presages contemporary debates about communal identities so frequently dismissed by classical liberals.

More fundamentally, however, it is a mistake to identify the entire post-1688 parliamentary tradition with classical liberalism. There was always an opposition, and parliamentary privileges were offered both to the court and country parties (more or less). Liberals, Conservatives, and Radicals were each essential in the life of parliament as it developed around the globe; no single partisan tradition can claim to be the essence of parliamentary democracy any more than any subcurrent of partisan thought party can claim to be the essence of a political party.

Moreover, while public goods may legitimize restrictions on individual liberties, it is essential to exercise caution and restraint in prescribing such restrictions. Where restrictions are imposed, they must not be ad hoc judicial prescriptions in particular circumstances, as there is a tendency for such judgements to decay into a strikingly limp version of utilitarianism. The parliamentary tradition is filled debates on acceptable restrictions, re-evaluations, reforms, and liberalisations. And since parliament is the proper arena for political opposition, it is appropriate that elected assemblies rather than courts take the responsibility for any restrictions on rights they may prescribe for good governance. Judicial review and its attempted finality does not enable meaningful opposition. The “reasonable limitations” and “notwithstanding” clauses in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms reflect a stream of thought within the broader parliamentary tradition from which red toryism originates. The challenge we are faced with today is not so much whether there are reasonable limitations on individual rights, but rather by which criteria such limitations are to be established.

4. Internationalism

Conservatism is often characterized as a political vision prioritizing local particularities over abstract universals. And this is a good first-pass criterion. However, I suggest that red toryism takes a broader view of ‘particularity’ than is common to today’s blue conservatives.

Red tories were historically associated with support for the British Empire. Today’s red tories ought not pine for the return of imperialism, but from that past can nonetheless draw a fourth principle: red tories view Canada as a nation within a broader common history, and thus in partnership with other nations in pursuit of an international common good. Far from exalting the nation-state as the ultimate expression of political identity, red tories see even a nation as merely one particular among others, and for this reason are capable of conceiving of common goods which transcend merely national interests. The particularity of a nation, like the particularity of an individual, only exists in the context of a broader community with its own proper goods, irreducible to merely national or individual interests. International law and international institutions – such as the United Nations, the European Union, and perhaps someday CANZUK – embody valuable ideals to the red tory, and ideally elevate rather than erode a nation’s freedom and interests.

Among mainstream conservatism, there remains the Enlightenment premium placed upon nation states. It is common in conservative circles to deride the United Nations, the European Union, and even international law itself on the grounds that such institutions undermine national sovereignty. To be clear, I myself have criticisms and concerns regarding these institutions also! But my own critiques and concerns do not stem from a desire for national self-determination contra mundum. Individual freedom is not maximized by scorning association with peers, and neither is national freedom. The red tory views international cooperation and associations as precious elements of the Western political tradition. These elements need to be reformed and built up, not rejected and torn down.

Red toryism’s internationalist disposition also contrasts against alt-right forms of nationalism, such as those driving the disquieting emergence of the Dominion Society – a group which claims to draw its principles from Canada’s historic identity. Far from taking an expansive view of the common good, conceived as existing even among nations, these pseudo-nationalists see other nations as a threat to Canada’s interests. Even though the Dominion Society claims to draw its principles from an expansive conception of the common good, its pseudo-nationalism is fundamentally a rejection of the Western civilizational traditions underpinning Canada’s founding. Far from believing in a broad political tradition claimed by no single race or local culture, they exalt local culture (and seemingly race – I don’t know how else to interpret their emphasis on ancestry and “ethnogenesis”) as the proper expression of Western civilization. This kind of nihilistic moral relativism is inconsistent with the tory tradition in general, and deeply alien to red toryism in particular. Fortunately, such pseudo-nationalists remain a fringe minority, are excluded from the conservative mainstream, and have no part to play within red toryism.

I have thus far described internationalism as an essential principle of red toryism without mentioning red tories’ traditional exception: America. George Grant famously described the United States of America as the universal and homogeneous state, and it must be recognized that one of the many cultural subcurrents within the USA is one of expansion by right and jingoistic interventionism, a subculture which is in tension with many of America’s better angels and yet continues to exist. Suffice it to say that red tories will tend to see Canada’s future as better secured by closeness with the United Kingdom and Europe, even in their present weaknesses, than by closeness to the United States, especially in its present predation.

This tendency need not undermine fruitful cooperation with the USA on continental defence or trade, nor does it mean that Canada is going to be more closely integrated with Europe than with the USA. We are already closely integrated with the USA, and increased integration does not seem likely. Rather than fruitlessly pursuing further American integration, we should preserve what integration we have and focus on increasing ties with Europe. We are a nation on the North American continent, it is true, but we are also a maritime nation – we are not landlocked, and we should act accordingly.

Remaining alive and well

There is a nagging concern with the term ‘red tory’ which is frequently raised: the term has become so widely muddled and misused that any attempt to revive its original sense is only going to add to the confusion. Given this confusion, the term is unhelpful at best, and should be set aside in favour of other terms less saddled by ambiguity.

This concern makes sense, but at what cost? Is there any other political label which doesn’t suffer from comparable ambiguity and widespread misuse? The word ‘liberal’ is often used as a pejorative in North America, and typically by people who embrace a particularly individualist form of… well, liberalism. Similarly, ‘socialist’ is often used as a pejorative, yet with little other than vibes. Even when used by smarter people, the term ‘liberalism’ has been claimed equally by George Will and by John Rawls. The term ‘social democrat’ has been claimed by religiously observant figures such as Bill Blaikie, and yet when used today seems typically to evoke (even erroneously) the likes of Bernie Sanders or Avi Lewis. And the term ‘conservative’ is itself quite ambiguous, claimed equally by David Frum and the writers at the excellent Without Diminishment newsletter. Even a term such as ‘post-liberal’, a term gaining newfound political prominence, is highly ambiguous, claimed by figures such as Viktor Orbán but also by niche integralists, including some who apparently defend some form of slavery.

Not a single one of these eclectic figures is particularly similar to any of the others, yet several of them share common political labels (and sometimes more than one label). Every political label is ambiguous and contested, and yet continues to be used and useful. The label ‘red tory’ continues to be used, and that is itself one reason to advocate for reviving its older meaning: whether the older meaning catches on or not, total neglect of the term is unwarranted. Indeed, the apparent and alarming embrace of the term by remigrationists from the Dominion Society is itself sufficient reason for those of us who reject racism to revive the term. Just as the Red Ensign is a lovely national symbol and should not be neglected to the point that racists can coopt it, so also is the red tory tradition far too interesting and principled to be left decaying into use as a dogwhistle.

I have proposed four principles which I suggest are implicit in the red tory tradition. I expect and hope that all four will be vigourously and courteously disputed, as disputation is a sign of life! If red toryism is indeed a living tradition, it needs to be sufficiently alive and well that it can withstand internal debates, let alone external debates. And if there are to be internal debates, there must also be distinct hues of red toryism, and the intensity and location of redness in policy will vary. (I myself am a red tory in the sense of an ideological conservative with conventional economic views, yet also endorse a handful of odd quasi-socialist notions mostly drawn from my Catholicism.) I look forward to seeing these hues developed and expanded here in the Red Tory Standard.

By Cliff Clemotte

Abstract: Benjamin Disraeli, a nineteenth century British Conservative prime minister, believed that the British tradition of civil rights was founded upon an elevating form equality which raises individuals higher, in contrast to ideals of equality which sought only to level the field of talent and privilege. The latter conception of equality remains common today, whether among progressives or right-leaning populists. Disraeli’s account of civil rights in connection to the notion of elevating equality is relevant to contemporary debates on the nature of Canadian conservatism, as it creates an intellectual space for a political vision which is neither classical liberalism nor post-liberalism.

Canadian conservatives have recently been debating whether conservatism should be strictly identified as classical liberalism or can be expanded into alternative political philosophies distinct from classical liberalism. The former frequently claim, in defence of the identification of conservatism with a form of liberalism, that they are conserving the classical liberal values upon which Canada was founded. In contrast, conservatives on the so-called new right have tended to identify themselves as post-liberal conservatives. I suggest that this latter identification is an error in at least two ways: it is an inaccurate way to characterize the philosophical debate, and it is politically unwise given that international post-liberalism is led by political figures such as J. D. Vance and Viktor Orban, whose governing impulses are contrary to the rule of law and incrementally disposed towards authoritarianism instead of freedom and fairness, backed up by a slew of academics creating intellectual excuses for those impulses. I will briefly return to the philosophical point at the end of this piece. Against the backdrop temptations of defining conservatism either as classical liberalism or post-liberalism, I will offer no definitions of conservatism. Instead, I suggest that contemporary conservatives in general (and red tories in particular) can gain valuable philosophical insights from Benjamin Disraeli.

Benjamin Disraeli (1804 – 1881) was a Conservative prime minister of the United Kingdom in the late nineteenth century, and an active partisan for several decades prior to his premiership. His first premiership began and ended in 1868, and his second premiership lasted from 1874 to 1880. His writings are a window into anglophone political thought near the period of Canadian Confederation, and his earlier writings in particular are a fascinating example of British political thinking in the early nineteenth century.

Of particular interest to me and my purposes is his 1835 text Vindication of the English Constitution in a Letter to a Noble and Learned Lord (hereafter Vindication). It is readily available as a reprint, though I have been unable to find a critical edition – or any edition meeting contemporary academic standards for a primary source. This is unfortunate, as Disraeli’s insights are surprisingly relevant to contemporary political debates, in addition to reflecting the intellectual and political climate of the time. I will not suggest that Canada’s founders and the British North America Act were directly influenced by Disraeli’s thought, but rather that Disraeli’s thoughts on constitutional principles and political values are indicative of the breadth of mainstream political thought in the early nineteenth century. And as I will show, it is extremely anachronistic to describe Disraeli as either a classical liberal or a post-liberal.

Disraeli’s primary focus in Vindication is constitutional principles, but his analysis and reflections also extend to partisan political ideals. The first portion of the text is devoted to a historical analysis of the development of the English Constitution. Setting aside the historical accuracy or inaccuracy of his narrative history, two key points quickly become clear: first, Disraeli thought of the English parliamentary tradition as a tradition pre-existing the socio-political movements we collectively label as the Enlightenment, rather than as a product of the Englightenment; and second, he understood liberty (which he describes as the “equality of civil rights”) to be the indispensable element of English law, and ultimately the element which enabled British stability and prosperity.

These two key points are inseparable in Disraeli’s analysis. Interestingly, Disraeli does not view the “glorious” legal framework structured around the “equality of civil rights” as a bounty provided by John Locke. Instead, he viewed this legal and cultural premium on freedom as the legacy of the fourteenth and fifteenth century Lancastrians. “Liberty flourished under the Plantagenets,” Disraeli argues, because this period’s governance was structured by the accountability of government to the House of Commons and the existence of a legitimate opposition. Again, ignore questions of historical accuracy: the important point is that Disraeli clearly understood civil liberties and the bicameral Parliament to be the enabling context within which liberal political philosophies emerged, and not the reverse. Nor is Disraeli unusual in this view. As Janet Ajzenstat has argued, Canada’s founders likewise viewed the institution of Parliament as the institution which enables civil liberties. It was common at the time to understand civil liberties and Parliamentary government as a broader political tradition than liberalism as a political philosophy.

Disraeli’s target in the Vindication is the Utilitarians of his day – at least those Utilitarian thinkers interested in constitutional reform. Their goal, in his view, was “to submit the institutions of the country to the test of utility, and to form a new constitution on the abstract principles of theoretic science,” so as better to represent the entirety of the English people. In this regard, the Utilitarians of the time shared a common principle with contemporary progressives and populists alike: the legitimacy of a system of government increases proportionally to the level of democratic representation it embodies. Much contemporary criticism of the Canadian Senate or the first-past-the-post voting system stems from such attitudes.

Against this, Disraeli notes that such an approach tended to create an elected body which claimed to speak on behalf of ‘the People’. He then argues that the natural tendency of such elected bodies is to treat opposition to the government as an illegitimate attack upon ‘the People’. In the name of ‘the People’ opposition is crushed, legitimizing a tyranny of the majority to the detriment of the previously legitimate minority. Appeal to ‘the People’ excludes minority dissent. And again, this is not an idea unique to Disraeli; a few decades later, none other than Sir John A. Macdonald rejected calls for referenda on Confederation on the grounds that referenda are an instance of oppressive majoritarianism, which he terms “an unbridled democracy” (Macdonald, Canadian Legislative Assembly, February 6 1865). This idea was clearly part of the political culture of the time.

Against such unbridled democracy, Disraeli reflects at length on the importance of non-elective representation in the English Constitution, primarily focusing upon the House of Lords. However, especially conjoined to the dangers presented to minority opposition by a government claiming to represent ‘the People’ in total, it is worth considering the unelected elements of the Canadian Constitution also. The Senate is the most obvious example, but I think we often overlook about the most fundamental unelective element of our nation: the Constitution itself. Insofar as the Constitution is a constraint on the will of the majority (something Macdonald very clearly intended it to be) it is an obstacle to pure democracy and a check against ‘the People’ themselves. If contemporary conservatives are to preserve the central principle of the Parliamentary tradition, they would do well to consider the risks created by claiming to represent ‘the people of Canada’ and populist politics in general.

Whereas the Utilitarians advocated for “an equality that levels,” such that “no one should be privileged,” Disraeli instead advocates for “an equality that elevates,” such that “every one should be privileged.” By this, he means what we might today describe as equality of opportunity. More broadly, this is enabled by the “equality of civil rights,” including especially “the right of expressing my free thoughts to a free people.” In each of these ideas, Disraeli expresses ideas surprisingly salient even to contemporary political debates. In spite of this, however, Disraeli should not be considered a classical liberal.

Despite endorsing “equality that elevates,” Disraeli also endorsed the class distinctions of the time. For him, the “equality that elevates” meant that an individual was not forcibly retained in one class nor prevented from rising to higher offices (a possibility well reflected in Disraeli’s own remarkable life).

As Equality is the basis, so Gradation is the superstructure… Our equality is the safety valve of tumultuous spirits; our gradation the security of the humble and meek. The latter take refuge in their order; the former seek relief in emancipating themselves from its rank.

A crucial part of this societal gradient is the constitutional role filled by the hereditary Lords. And admittedly, this aspect of Disraeli’s thought should rightly raise doubts about his relevance today. Even in the nineteenth century the idea of a Canadian hereditary peerage seemed absurd. And after all, the notion that some types of inequality are both inescapable and essential to a functional society is one already articulated by contemporary authors such as Roger Scruton. Disraeli might seem superfluous at best, antiquated at worst.

However, when establishing the Senate, the Canadian founders did so in the belief that a non-elective chamber was important to good government, and that this role would be fulfilled by individuals demonstrating the necessary merit – or at least talented ambition. And here lies a kernel of truth to Disraeli’s praise for gradation: talents and privileges are unevenly distributed, and this unevenness makes possible the elevation of the under-privileged by the privileged. Too often, progressive ideals aspire to a society which compensates for such uneven distribution; Rawls’ famed “veil of ignorance” was proposed as one such compensating conceptual mechanism.

Instead of seeking to eliminate uneven distribution of talents and privileges, Disraeli sees this unevenness as a mechanism for building and uplifting a nation. He does not merely note that some inequalities are inescapable, or even that they can enable beneficial outcomes; his unique contribution is the idea that elevating equality is inherently linked to the existence of other inequalities. One might characterize this as a conceptual analysis of the concept of equality itself, in which Disraeli identifies an internal conceptual tension. His political vision is intended to resolve that tension.

If one takes seriously Disraeli’s idea that gradation in society enables aspirational opportunities, that without a graded plane of merited and unmerited achievements there would be nothing ‘higher’ to which to aspire, then individual differences become more important to policy than class differences. For instance, the red tory ideal of an active government implementing policies which support and raise up the vulnerable is an example of the more secure elements of society (namely, the state itself) ensuring that those further down the gradient are not abandoned. But this political approach is not purely financial; it extends more broadly across human life, as apparent in Disraeli’s defence of the House of Lords.

Disraeli thought of the Lords as an essential element of the parliamentary body – not just when engaged in public deliberation, but also in cultivating education, culture, and other social goods for the benefit of the nation as a whole. The entire life of the Lords was a contribution to the state, despite the Lords’ frequent failings. (The novel Brideshead Revisited presents with profound vividness an interpretation of that value’s endurance through imperfect vessels.) The importance is not really the Lords themselves, but rather the comprehensiveness of their potential contributions. Thus, the generalizable principle from Disraeli’s particular focus on the Lords is that the state ought to contribute actively towards building the economic and cultural institutions on which a nation’s life depends, and not merely on wealth redistribution.

While Disraeli’s ideal of class harmony seems far too rosy compared to the actual past, he nonetheless leaves us with a valuable conceptual framework: a society that values the “equality that elevates” must also be a society with inequalities through which the state can elevate the under-privileged. And if the pairing of elevating equality with unequal privilege is ever going to supply “the security of the humble and the meek,” then the state must take a lead in supplying such security on behalf of its privileged members. When stripped of its classist original meaning, Disraeli’s conceptual pairing of equality and gradation carries striking philosophical implications for policy ideals.

Returning to my philosophical concern with the implied meaning of ‘post-liberalism’ as a political label, Disraeli’s reflections on both constitutional thought and partisan political principles are valuable to today’s intra-conservative debates. Too many conservatives identify not only their conservatism but also parliamentary democracy itself with classical liberalism, such that those who reject classical liberalism are automatically presumed to oppose free and fair democratic society altogether. Yet the parliamentary tradition has historically been understood as pre-existing liberalism, as encompassing political ideologies other than liberalism, and as in fact supplying the laws and traditions which inspired and enabled liberalism in the first place.

When conservatives who reject classical liberalism label themselves as post-liberals, they implicitly concede the classical liberals’ claims to exclusive ownership of parliamentary democracy. They inadvertently imply that their approach to conservatism is one which comes only after the prior stages of the parliamentary tradition, when in fact many of the concerns they rightly raise against liberalism were freely debated by the historic parliamentarians themselves – and debated in defence of freedom.

Critiques of liberalism first appeared in the context of a free and fair deliberative society with a proud tradition of civil rights. We would do well to revisit that tradition in its authentically expansive form, and to resist the temptation to identify its freedoms and equalities with only one political philosophy. Disraeli shows quite well that the aspirational ideals of freedom and elevating equality can be articulated, defended, and implemented from within a traditional tory framework, and his reflections remain highly relevant today.